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Abstract
I (hereafter: the writer)2 argue that, first of all, the freedom of religion and some
standards of freedom of religion (hereafter: SFR) is absolute. In addition, different
concepts of God do not change SFR, and this claim proves that revises of God's ideas
do not lean toward of restructuring of SFR. These two claims have been presented by
an argument that the writer calls the slap argument. Last but not least, the slap
argument shows that theocracy suffers from these delighted features of SFR.3
Freedom and Alternatives Concepts of God
Different varieties of the concepts of God or deity or other maximally great beings or
the divine have been manifested, and they open up new lifestyles and worldviews for
their followers and other people who are thirsty for new religious beliefs and
practices. The first note is that there are some traditional theism such as
Zoroastrianism, Abrahamic religions, Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, so many others
have been promoting this idea that there is a distinction between God4 and the
universe. However, there are some interpretations, thinkers, and religions of them as
traditional theism that they refuse the distinctness wholly. Besides that, there are
modern theologies and religious philosophical worldviews that have been eradicated
the distinction between the universe and God.5 In addition, the writer does not
concern with those traditional or modern theologies and religious philosophical
worldviews. Also, it is not our business to know that which one is true. The writer's
concerns are whether theologies or worldviews that reject the distinction, they affect
SFR6 or not? Besides that, to the writer's knowledge, SFR is absolute freedom, and
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theocracy waste this truth. To prove these claims, the writer will present the Slap
Argument (hereafter: SA).
The Slap Argument: Slap on the Back
A philosopher presents a definition of freedom in which it appears it would be a
begging to debate:
"Now, standardly, when freedom is exercised, the agent exercising it aims to make
the world (in the relevant respect) conform to his will." (Cohen, 2011, p. 78)7
First of all, "static conception" of SFR that is "weight" of religion in citizen's life and
state ought to "respect" religions and do not "interfere" in religions, although there is
another type of SFR is "transformative" which is known SFR with two limitations.8
The writer neither compromises the former model of SFR nor the latter, because, the
writer thinks it needs both a serious and stable constraint and absolute liberty of it.9
The writer will do that by SA. The writer will concentrate on SA because it seems that
it could solve the "paradox" of SFR,10 from obstacles of it.11 They promote "religious
tolerance" when it is a struggle with religion and these issues have been arrived from
different religions and occurs on the religious actions.12
Significantly, the paradox13 could be known as this:
"religious freedom is thought to protect the religious beliefs that underlie such
practices … Some religious practices and religious beliefs … are rightly condemned
and discouraged by the legitimate state" (Brettschneider, 2010, p. 190).
But, it seems that this literature focuses only on liberal democracies and if one
criticizes the primary values such as freedom or equality in liberal democracies, the
proponent of it needs to start from very introductory arguments. For example, in a
theocracy, SFR is far away from SFR in liberal democracy. The writer -unlike the
other authors- will not apply some normative legal, political, moral principles and
arguments to solve this paradox, but also, the writer will undermine the proportion
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of religion to the whole of our life by drawing on a Kantian term of thisworldly and
otherworldly distinction.14
Let the writer begins with the positive side of SR. it is positive because it seems that
SFR is a symbol of absolute freedom. These claims have been motivated by the
otherworldly aspect of it. Nobody and nothing could be compliant with your SFR if
you avoid the constraint of SFR:
 Religious beliefs and practices have absolute SFR iff it remains deeply and
wholly belongs to otherworldly beliefs and practices. That means if you
involve in a thisworldly problem you have to apply the thisworldly concepts
and entities and avoid otherworldly concepts and entities. Otherwise, there is
a conflict between the former and the latter one, and then, you defeat this
criterion if you choose the latter one.
This criterion shows SFR as negative freedom,15 if SFR would participate in politics,
law, public social institutions, and so many others like them, then clearly there is a
constraint that principally has to prior to the SFR.16
For instance, imagine Niki is driving on a highway to reach the saint temple, there is
theurgy in the temple that is the once in a lifetime, but there is also a volcanic
eruption close to the temple and so, local Police block the crossroads because of the
eruption. It is clear that no one could move off the crossroads, and the police do not
permit anyone to go there. Niki prefers to be there and she is ready to face the danger.
She does not think that it is pulling a stunt and believes if she does not attend the
ceremony, then she abjures her religion. We observe a conflict between a case for
banning between freedom of participating in an important religious ceremony and
willing of the police officers to save the lives. The positive side of SA argues that you
have absolute freedom of religion when you apply it as otherworldly and if there is a
conflict between the otherworldly and thisworldly believes and actions, the former
one is the last priority and so, Nike ought to obey the Police Officers.17 Altogether,
you have an absolute SFR there is a severe constraint on SFR that is SFR has to
remains only otherworldly. The writer calls the positive side of SA as the slap on the
back.
Theories of freedom -like SFR- could not refuse SA, because it is based on some
sorts of otherworldly beliefs and practices that all of the theories such as "positive
14 For SFR is not identical with freedom of conscience, see: (Rawls, 1996 [1393], pp. 431-5) , (Rawls,
1999 [1393], p. 229), (Rawls, 1999 [1390], p. 99), (Schmidtz & Bernnan , 2010, pp. 171-2), (Maclure &
Taylor, 2011 [1399], p. 91).
15 For this claim, see: (Carter, 2019).
16 For individual and subjective religion, see: (Maclure & Taylor, 2011 [1399], pp. 83-6).
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and negative liberty", "republican liberty" and "Freedom as a Triadic Relation",
"libertarian freedom" could be free from obstacles.18
To illustrate, you could have SFR negatively, since SFR has a "mere absence of
something" like interferences, no one could stop you to have SFR unless it does not
remain religious. In conditions that SFR follows SA, it seems that politically there
would not be conflict.19 That means if one interprets SFR from the perspective of
freedom, then she will come up with the idea that there is no "absence" of obstacles.
Also, if one knows SFR in republican terms then, she will agree with SA because it
does not conflict with "non-domination" or "self-mastery" of freedom which could be
another sphere when she put SFR in front of "republican liberty".20
Besides that, there is no constraint of SFR -to accept religion and express religious
beliefs and practices-21 which is come from SA and so, one could admire that SFR
could survive when playing a true role of itself.
Another objection would come from freedom in general sense in which there is a
questions how we could determine constraint in SFR ,22 and it seems to the writer's
mind SFR interestingly different from other types of freedom. It is owing to this fact
that all of other types of freedom and freedom in general except SFR do not involve
the before mentioned constraint, it means they have to be evaluated from different
perspective and this SFR's constraint is based on the thiswordly and otherworldly
distinction those others are not. For instance, one may argue against freedom of
speech, since, there is a serious constraint on it that is hate speech.23 But, look both
of them is involved with thiswordly issues. It is delighted aspect of SFR.24
The Slap Argument: Slap in the Face
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20 For Republican Liberty, see: (Pettit, 1997 [1388], pp. 40-137).
21 For these parts of SFR, see: (Maclure & Taylor, 2011 [1399], p. 69).
22 For constraint of freedom, see: (Carter, 2019), (Vallentyne, 2009, p. 140), (Cohen, 2011a), (Cohen,
2011b).
23 For freedom of speech, see: (van Mill, 2021), (Haworth, 1998), (Alexander, 2005).
24 For aesthetics of freedom, see: (Wingo, 2009).
How could the writer argue that SFR has nothing in common with different concepts
of God is that the writer acknowledges the proportions of religion to the whole of our
life have a serious constraint. That means that religion is an only otherworldly
concept in which other types of concepts of God that would push the God to this
world needs to add something otherworldly like God to thisworldly concepts and
entities.25
For instance, they had to say that:
 Pantheism: God is identical with the world, and so, there is a world where we
add God to it in an identical way,
 Panentheism: The world is a part of God, and so, there is a world that we add
God to it as containing way of it,
 Theistic Idealism: The word depends on the mind of God, and so, there is a
world that God is added to it as the former depends on the latter,
 Atheism: There is no God in this world, that we add God to this world,
negatively.26
Let the writer mention another aspect of the argument that is opted to the one to how
to identify and/or interprets his religious belief, practice, or his theology or religious
worldview. That shows if the one would like to unseen the distinctness then the one
will face answering what would be his option that a slap in the face:
 In a dissimilar way, we could perceive the former writer's criterion in this way
that religion includes religious beliefs and practices that the adjective of -
religious- could only be identified iff it precludes the religious from non-
religious one and it does not occur unless we grasp the religious as
otherworldly concepts and entity and know the non-religious one as
thiswordly. This new criterion shows that different concepts of God do not
affect the SFR. Due to the fact that different concepts of God lead to the
traditional theism and God by knowing them to be added to this world or
would be thisworldly.
Let one more time, to know that whether the Niki as a panentheist or pantheist or
theistic idealist, theistic fictionalist, theistic ultimist, and so many others would
decline SFR or not.27
The first example is that Niki believes God is identical with the world and due to the
reason that SFR is absolute, she is free to believe pantheism in the condition that it
follows the first criterion in which pantheism has to remain otherworldly and we
know that pantheism is otherworldly, because it only adds God to this world
identically. As a result, Niki may wrongfully claim that she ought to participate in the
ceremony, also, she may argue that she is not obligated to obey the police officer
order and it is because the eruption is identical with God and so, there is no conflict
between the theurgy for God and the eruption, then, the police have not to issue an
25 For otherworldly basis of religion, see: (Pasternack & Fugat, 2021), (Schmidtz & Bernnan , 2010)
26 For the advanced and different definitions of those alternative theologies and god, see: (Ibid).
27 For these labels, see: (Buckareff & Nagasawa, 2016).
order on the moving off and Niki could also disobey the order. Although undeniably,
this case is a slap in the face to Niki, since, she may die as soon as active volcanic
erupts, she will die and rescuers and firefighters may die because of her. Altogether it
does not matter how you place your faith in God as pantheist or theist, there will be a
death toll rose.
Another example will be exactly the same as the abovementioned example, Niki
believes the world is a part of God and due to the reason that SFR is absolute, she is
free to believe Panentheism in the condition that it follows the first criterion in which
Panentheism has to remain otherworldly and we know that Panentheism is
otherworldly, because it only adds God to this world as containing way of it. As a
result, Niki may wrongfully claim that she ought to participate in the ceremony, also,
she may argue that she is not obligated to obey the police officer order and it is
because the eruption is a part of God and the same story: there is no conflict between
the theurgy for God and the eruption, then, the police have not to issue an order on
the moving off and Niki could also disobey the order. Although undeniably, this case
is a slap in the face to Niki, since, she may die as soon as active volcanic erupt, she
will die and rescuers and firefighters may die because of her. Altogether, it does not
matter how you place your faith in God as pantheist or theist, there will be a death
toll rose.
You could replace Pantheism or Panentheism with different kinds of modern
theologies or religious philosophical worldviews. However, the writer's two criteria
will remain the same.
Theocracy's Embarrassing: The Slap Argument
The writer's point in this section is that theocracy lacks of both faces of SFR in which
it has not neither SFR as mentioned in the SA on the back and nor SA in the face
arguments. The writer's argument on the SFR in theocracy (Hereafter: SFRT) is this:
1. SFRT suffers from the slap on the back argument (with an official religion):
o SFRT in this argument has some serious difficulties,
o Imagine, a theocracy announces an or some religion(s) as an official on
religion(s) of a government, then,
o First of all, it will face with nonbelievers of the official religion who do
not believe in the official religion,
o What would be response of the theocracy to them?
o A question will arise that whether the theocracy will know them as a
second citizen?
o Because, they could not be as other citizens who their religion is same
as the official religion iff the theocracy only behave toward them
neutrally,
o That means, they lack of something unjustifiably that other citizens
who live in the theocracy have it,
o It will be discriminatory.
o Another response of the theocracy would be that the theocracy will
threaten nonbelievers with cruelties such as prison, torture, massacre,
death penalty and many others?
o In this case, the theocracy will do something that is not neutral, those
one identified as cruelties. Undeniably, it will be brutal.
o As a consequence, the theocracy could not enjoy freedom and more
importantly, it could not use delighted aspect of SFR as an absolute
freedom.
2. SFRT suffers from the slap on the back argument (without an official religion):
o Imagine that a theocracy which is based on an or some religion(s)
do not announce an or some religion(s) as an official religion(s),
o That means, they only run an or some religion(s) as a basis for
political authority and governing a country functionally,
o Then it seems that they one more time will struggle in some strict
problems,
o Because, inherently, it has changed the otherworldly identity of that
religion(s) and SFR which is the basis for political authority and
governing the country to thisworldly one, functionally
o It is not only to the believers, but also, it is to the nonbelievers,
o As a result, they face with not only the Niki example, but also, it will
suffer from that it could not use delighted aspect of SFR as an
absolute freedom.
o Although, in this case, one more time, both discrimination and
cruelties would arise again.
3. SFRT suffers from the slap in the face argument:
o If the second constraint is true then it seems that it does not change
the first and second cases of SFRT,
o It is due to fact that if the alternatives concepts of God remain SFR
all of discrimination, cruelties, the functional problem of Niki
example and delighted aspect of SFR would come again.
4. SFRT in both arguments suffers from this claim that which God or religion is
true to be as a basis for this or that political authority and so, admitting or
refusing of SFR could solve the plurality concepts of God and religion.
If the slap argument is true as SFR and SFRT, it is clearly that theocracy suffers from
a political value that is called freedom.
Conclusion
All in all, SA will prove that SFR is not only absolute iff the former criterion is
satisfied, but also, different concepts of God do not revise absolute SFR iff the latter
criterion is fulfilled. Even though, Theocracy suffers from these delighted features of
SFR.
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